April 23, 2025

https://www.ejiltalk.org/emerging-animal-rights-and-their-anthropo-zoo-and-ecocentric-justifications/

Written by Saskia Stucki

Editor’s note: This post is part of the EJIL:Talk! Symposium on ‘Expanding Human Rights Protection to Non-Human Subjects? African, Inter-American and European Perspectives.’

The idea of expanding the normative framework of human rights to nonhuman entities is not quite new, but ever-so topical in the age of AI, corporate human rights, and the rise of the global Rights of Nature movement. Although animals may be paradigmatic (non)human rights aspirants, animal rights proper have not yet been adjudicated, let alone recognized, by the ‘sister regional human rights courts’ or international human rights bodies.

In recent years, however, animal rights have increasingly become an issue before domestic courts, even highest courts, such as the Supreme Court of India, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, the Islamabad High Court, or a lower court in Mendoza (Argentina). It is interesting to note that the judicial recognition of animal rights is so far more or less exclusively driven not by European or North American courts, but by courts from the Global South, which seems to refute the charge of “cultural imperialism” or Eurocentrism that is sometimes attached to the idea of universal animal rights. Given these contemporary developments in domestic animal rights law, and following a “bottom-up” approach to the future formation of a global animal rights law, the question seems not if, but when animal rights will advance to the world stage and eventually enter the halls of international (non)human rights courts.

Emerging animal rights and their pluralistic drivers

Since its inception, the idea of animal rights has had a mostly theoretical existence. In the absence of any legally institutionalized rights, the concept of animal rights typically relates to potential fundamental rights that (nonhuman) animals should have and that ought to be recognized and respected by human laws. Only recently, but with accelerating pace, have courts around the world started to deliberate and recognize actual legal rights of animals (see here for an overview of global animal rights jurisprudence).

One noteworthy difference between the ideal animal rights conceived by theorists and the real animal rights recognized in legal practice is the justificatory pluralism driving the emergence of the latter (as opposed to the justificatory monism – mostly of the naturalistic variant – that tends to ground the former). That is, while animal rights in theory are typically justified with reference to some morally relevant rights-generative natural quality of animals, animal rights in practice seem to be grounded in a broader and more heterogenous mix of divergent yet mutually complementing rationales.

Elsewhere, I have argued that there are both principled and prudential reasons that warrant institutional recognition of animal rights. In short, the principled argument for animal rights is of an ethical nature (a matter of justice or morality) and operates with intrinsic criteria, such as animals’ sentience, dignity, vulnerability, exploitability, or experiences of injustice. By contrast, the prudential argument for animal rights is of an instrumental nature (animal rights as a means of promoting other ends, e.g. the protection of humans or the environment) and relies on extrinsic considerations, such as social and environmental benefits that may result from cultivating animal rights-respecting practices.

Here, I will chart a slightly adapted, tripartite typology, based on the anthropocentric, zoocentric, and ecocentric justifications underpinning the recognition of animal rights in practice.

Anthropocentric underpinnings of animal rights

From an anthropocentric point of view, animal rights are justified instrumentally with their utility or benefits for human individuals or societies. Here, the recognition of animal rights is primarily motivated by and derivative of human interests, and functions as an indirect way of protecting or promoting certain human goods, such as human rights or health. Commonly invoked anthropocentric reasons for recognizing animal rights relate to:

• The linkages between human and animal (in)justice: a growing body of research (see here for an overview) suggests a correlation between discriminatory (e.g. sexist, racist, speciesist) and rights-affirming social attitudes as well as empathy towards human outgroups and animals. Similarly, important links seem to exist between violence against humans and animals, both on the level of interpersonal (e.g. domestic or sadistic) and collective violence (e.g. animalistic dehumanization). Recognizing – and respecting – animal rights may thus concomitantly contribute to the protection of (vulnerable and marginalized) humans.
  
• Animal exploitation as a major driver of environmental human rights and public health threats: the need to establish animal rights as a bulwark against extractive exploitation is also increasingly debated in the context of protecting humans against existential environmental risks. This is because animal exploitation (notably industrial animal farming and wildlife trade) is a major driver of global health threats (such as the emergence of zoonotic diseases and antimicrobial resistance) and of ecological human rights threats (such as climate change and biodiversity loss).
  
• Cultural and religious reasons: certain (beloved or revered) animals are more equal than others, and are afforded special legal protections for cultural or religious reasons. For example, some courts, notably in Latin America, have recognized rights of companion animals (such as a dog in Colombia) as part of the protection of multispecies families and the affective bonds that humans have with their nonhuman family members. Another relevant example is the 2024 He Whakaputanga Moana Treaty (Declaration for the Ocean) – an Indigenous treaty that recognizes whales as legal persons, inter alia, because whales are considered ancestral beings and an integral part of a healthy ecosystem.

Zoocentric constructions of animal rights

Within a zoocentric frame of reference, animal rights are justified with intrinsic qualities of animals, such as their dignity or inherent value, sentience, personhood or subjecthood, or vulnerability. Here, the recognition of animal rights is primarily motivated by and centred on a legal concern for animals and their interests per se, irrespective of any instrumental or utilitarian considerations. In the words of the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, “animals should not be protected only from an ecosystemic perspective or with a view to the needs of human beings, but mainly from a perspective that focuses on their individuality and intrinsic value”. Courts typically arrive at zoocentric animal rights through two different legal avenues:

• Subjectification of animal welfare laws: some courts have derived animal rights from existing animal welfare laws, by extracting therefrom subjective animal rights as implicit correlatives of explicit human duties. For example, in a landmark judgment from 2014 (which has since been somewhat relativized and reversed), the Supreme Court of India recognized a range of animal rights, such as the right to life and security, protection against pain, suffering, and torture, to food and shelter, based on the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. It further elevated these statutory rights to the status of fundamental rights by reading them alongside the constitutional provision on animal protection and compassion (the “magna carta of animal rights”).
  
• Animalization of fundamental (human) rights: other courts, notably in the Americas, have probed the possibility of extending certain human rights to animals, such as the prohibition of slavery, or the procedural right of habeas corpus and the underlying substantive right to freedom. In the USA, courts have thus far declined to enlarge the protective scope of fundamental rights to animals other than humans (of course, corporations are a different story). By contrast, courts in Latin America (e.g. in Argentina and Colombia) have recognized animal rights based on a dynamic and extensive reading of constitutional rights (notably the right to habeas corpus).

Ecocentric foundations of animal rights

From an ecocentric perspective, animal rights are recognized in an eco-constitutional legal context (e.g. a “sociobiocentric” constitution) and as part of a holistic approach to environmental protection and rights. Against the backdrop of exacerbating ecological pressures in the Anthropocene, the environmental dimension of animal rights (as well as, conversely, the animal dimension of environmental rights) has become increasingly important in recent years. Courts, too, have been responsive to the human-animal-environment nexus, by converging or integrating the rights of humans, animals, and nature.

• (Wild) animal rights as part of rights of nature: one form of ecocentric animal rights is the recognition of (wild) animal rights as an integral (individual) dimension of the rights of nature. The integration of animal rights into the rights of nature framework has been elaborated at length by the Constitutional Court of Ecuador. In this context, some commentators observe a convergence between (animalized) rights of nature and (naturalized) animal rights, drawing on the obvious overlap and synergies between the two species of rights.
  
• Ecological interdependence of human and animal rights: lastly – and this might be the clearest example of the confluence of anthropocentric, zoocentric, and ecocentric motives that are conjoined in the configuration of emerging animal rights – animal rights can be justified on the grounds of their ecologically mediated interrelation with human rights. For example, the Islamabad High Court has noted the “interdependence of living beings” and recognized animal rights alongside, and as an integral part of, the human right to life and environmental protection.

A win-win-win for humans, animals, and the environment

As this overview has shown, the recognition of animal rights in practice is only partially motivated by (intrinsic, ethical) concern for animals, and concurrently catalysed by instrumental concern for a variety of human interests and environmental considerations. It is this interplay of anthropocentric, zoocentric, and ecocentric rationales that is driving the emergence of animal rights alongside human rights and environmental rights. Some commentators contend that the anthropocentric and ecocentric reasonings that co-constitute real animal rights provide for a merely “weak grounding for animal rights”. Others dispute that these ulterior motives work to constitute “genuine animal rights” altogether. I would however argue, on the contrary, that this justificatory pluralism makes for a more diverse and democratic, resilient, rhetorically powerful, and thus ultimately stronger legal footing for animal rights in the real world. The pluralistic foundations of emerging animal rights indicate that they can be plausibly and palatably framed as a win-win-win situation. Simply put, animal rights are good for humans, animals, and the precious – and precarious – planet we all share.